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Abstract 
Past research has linked action orientation to intuitive affect regulation (Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Kuhl, 
1981). The present research examines whether action orientation can regulate subliminally activated 
affect. In an experimental study, action- versus state-oriented participants were exposed to subliminal 
primes of schematic faces with an angry, neutral, or happy expression. Participants subsequently rated 
their affect on a basic affect measure. The results showed prime-congruent effects among state-oriented 
individuals: subliminal angry primes led to lower basic affect compared to subliminal happy primes. Ac-
tion-oriented participants were not influenced by the subliminal priming in their basic affective reactions. 
The authors conclude that action orientation is a regulator of basic affective responses, even when these 
responses are triggered outside of conscious awareness. 
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People sometimes feel good or bad without knowing exactly where these feelings 
come from. As experimental research suggests, affective reactions can be triggered by 
subliminal stimuli that are presented entirely outside of conscious awareness (Zajonc, 
2000). Subliminally triggered affect has been found to exert a pervasive influence on 
mood, evaluative judgments, social information processing, and behavior (Chartrand, 
Bargh, & Van Baaren, 2003; Stapel, Koomen, & Ruys, 2002; Winkielman, Berridge, & 
Wilbarger, 2005). Given that affective reactions sometimes interfere with people’s goal 
pursuits (Carver & Scheier, 1990), however, it seems important that people are able to 
regulate their affective reactions even if these are triggered subliminally. In the present 
article, we examine the role of action vs. state orientation (Kuhl, 1981) in the regulation 
of subliminally triggered affect. Specifically, we test the notion that action-oriented in-
dividuals are better able to resist the influence of subliminally triggered affect compared 
to state-oriented individuals.  
 
Feelings without a Cause: Evidence from Subliminal Priming Research 
 
In recent years, it has become increasingly evident that affective reactions can be based 
on only minimal cognitive processing and often even elude people’s conscious aware-
ness. Several lines of investigation have demonstrated that such “basic affective reac-
tions” (Winkielman et al., 2005) can be triggered by subtle changes in the environment 
(Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002), simple body movements (Cacioppo, 
Priester, & Berntson, 1993), or physical postures (Stepper & Strack, 1993). Throughout 
these different kinds of affect inducements, people typically remain unaware of the 
source of their affective reactions. Indeed, it appears that basic affective reactions are 
often diffuse and free-floating, and “spill over” into people’s experience of other stimuli 
that happen to come along (Zajonc, 2000). Moreover, basic affective reactions can in-
fluence behavioral initiative (Hertel & Hardin, 1990), or direct behavioral tendencies 
towards approach and avoidance (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Gray, 2001; Neumann, Förster, 
& Strack, 2003).   
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Some of the most compelling demonstrations of basic affective reactions can 
be found in the literature on subliminal affective priming (for recent reviews, see Ber-
ridge & Winkielman, 2003; Zajonc, 2000). In subliminal affective priming research, 
participants are first exposed to positive or negative affective stimuli for very brief dura-
tions that preclude conscious detection. After this initial exposure, participants’ affec-
tive reactions are assessed. A pioneering set of studies on subliminal affective priming 
was conducted by Murphy and Zajonc (1993). In these studies, participants were sub-
liminally primed with human faces expressing either happiness or anger. Following ex-
posure to these subliminal primes, participants had to express their preferences for un-
familiar Chinese ideographs. Results showed that participants rated ideographs more 
favorably when the prime was a happy rather than an angry face. Notably, no affective 
priming effects occurred when participants could consciously perceive the happy and 
angry face primes.  
The foregoing paragraphs suggest that the affective system is functionally dif-
ferent from, and operates independently of, conscious cognitive processing. In line with 
this notion, psychological and neurophysiological research has established that basic 
affective reactions occur early on in the information processing sequence, and can be 
triggered with minimal stimulus input (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Zajonc, 2000). 
Moreover, subliminal affective priming effects seem to be resistant to attempts at con-
scious control (Winkielman, Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997).  
The theoretical relevance of subliminal affective priming research extends be-
yond the laboratory. In everyday life, people often do not recognize the causes of their 
affective reactions. For instance, people show clear affective reactions in response to the 
weather, even though they often fail to identify the weather as a cause of their reactions 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In principle, people can realize that stimuli such as the 
weather have influenced their affective states. Oftentimes, however, the causes of peo-
ple's affective reactions remain inaccessible to them (Wilson & Dunn, 2004). People’s 
minds would possibly be overstrained if the causes for each separate affective reaction 
had to be processed on a conscious level. In real life, therefore, it seems likely that peo-
ple experience many affective states without knowing their cause. Subliminal affective 
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priming research may thus provide a window into the nature of basic affective reac-
tions that are common in everyday life.  
Research further suggests that subliminal affective priming can have important 
downstream consequences. In many cases, subliminally triggered basic affect does not 
outlive a second or so (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). However, when people encounter se-
quences of stimuli that are more consistently positive or negative, subliminal affective 
priming may accumulate and thereby become more durable (Chartrand et al., 2003, 
Stapel et al., 2002; Winkielman et al., 2005). Furthermore, the effects of subliminal af-
fective priming extend to cognitive and behavioral processes. For instance, subliminal 
affective priming has been found to influence stereotyping (Chartrand et al., 2003), as 
well as motivational responses such as consumption behavior (Winkielman et al., 2005). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that subliminally triggered affect plays an impor-
tant role in guiding cognition and behavior.  
 
Action Orientation and Affect Regulation 
 
It is conceivable that basic affective reactions that are triggered by subliminal affective 
priming may sometimes impede goal-directed behavior (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1990). To 
the extent that basic affect triggers behavioral tendencies (e.g., approach or avoidance) 
that are incompatible with people’s current goals, it is important for people to exert 
some level of control over this type of affect. For instance, worsened basic affect may 
activate behavioral avoidance tendencies (Gray, 2001) that interfere with the person’s 
intention to take initiative (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). Shielding one’s intentions thus 
seems to require some form of volitional control over one's basic affective reactions.  
How might people control subliminally triggered affect? Given the unconscious 
nature of basic affect, it is likely that its regulation also largely operates at unconscious 
levels. From this perspective, volitional control of subliminally triggered affect may be 
achieved when automatic affective responses (e.g. dejection caused by a rainy morning) 
can be overridden in favour of a more adaptive affective response (e.g., cheering up to 
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get a hard day’s work done). Similar to the volitional regulation of behavior (Norman 
& Shallice, 1986), the regulation of basic affect requires the activation of higher cortical 
functions (e.g., prefrontal cortex) in order to override inappropriate affective reactions 
(Kuhl, 2000).  
The regulation of basic affect has been addressed by Personality Systems Inter-
actions (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000). According to PSI theory, people are capable of regu-
lating basic affective reactions, even when they are unaware of their precise causes. 
This type of affect regulation is referred to as intuitive affect regulation (Koole & Jost-
mann, 2004). PSI theory further suggests that the functional basis for intuitive affect 
regulation is provided by extension memory, which is conceived of as a central execu-
tive system linked to the prefrontal cortex that provides integrated knowledge about the 
self and the environment. If the person responds to worsened basic affect with the acti-
vation of extension memory, affect becomes modulated so that it is congruent with the 
person’s current goal intentions, personal motives, and contextual constraints. Because 
extension memory provides rapid processing of vast amounts of complex information, 
its workings do not necessarily require the involvement of the conscious mind. In prin-
ciple, intuitive affect regulation pertains to both positive and negative affect. However, 
since goal-directed behavior is most impeded by negative affect (Simon, 1967), intuitive 
affect regulation is likely to be stronger when basic affect is worsened rather than when 
it is improved. 
Aided by intuitive affect regulation processes, people can pursue their goals 
even in the face of worsened basic affect. However, people do not invariably engage in 
intuitive affect regulation. According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), worsened basic affect 
triggers either a metastatic (change-oriented) or a catastatic (change-preventing) mode 
of regulation. During the metastatic mode of regulation, individuals are likely to activate 
central executive functions that promote intuitive affect regulation and goal-directed 
action. Therefore, the metastatic mode is referred to as action orientation. By contrast, 
during the catastatic mode, central executive functions and intuitive affect regulation are 
likely to be inhibited. Instead, individuals are more likely to become preoccupied with 
their current states while in a catastatic mode. The catastatic mode is therefore referred 
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to as state orientation. Taken together, action versus state orientation are mutually ex-
clusive regulatory modes that become triggered under conditions of worsened basic af-
fect.  
Whether a person is more likely to become action-oriented or state-oriented in 
response to worsened basic affect depends in part on stable individual differences 
(Kuhl, 2000). Based on their prior experiences with situations that cause significant 
changes in basic affect (i.e., demanding or threatening situations), some individuals may 
have learned to react in a predominantly action-oriented manner under conditions of 
worsened basic affect. By contrast, other individuals may have developed a tendency to 
react in a state-oriented manner when basic affect becomes more negative. In line with 
this reasoning, Kuhl (1981, 1994) developed a self-report scale to assess individual dif-
ferences in action versus state orientation. Based on their scores, some people can be 
characterized as predominantly state-oriented, whereas others can be characterized as 
predominantly action-oriented (for reviews and construct validity, see Diefendorff, Hall, 
Lord, & Strean, 2000; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994).  
Research has gathered ample evidence that individual differences in action ver-
sus state orientation are closely linked to intuitive affect regulation. A first line of re-
search has addressed the physiological and behavioral consequences of intuitive affect 
regulation. For instance, Heckhausen and Strang (1988) observed increased physiologi-
cal response (i.e., lactate concentration) and decreased athletic performance among 
state-oriented basketball players under performance pressure, whereas action-oriented 
players displayed no such effect in response to performance pressure. In a similar vein, 
Kuhl (1981) found performance decrements on a complex cognitive task after repeated 
failure experiences among state-oriented but not among action-oriented participants. 
Furthermore, a negative mood impaired complex coherence judgments among state-
oriented but not among action-oriented individuals (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). Finally, 
Jostmann and Koole (2005) demonstrated that the induction of mild stress diminished 
cognitive control, as indicated by the performance on the Stroop color naming task and 
related paradigms, among state-oriented individuals but not among action-oriented indi-
viduals.  
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 A second line of research has focused more directly on the affective conse-
quences of action orientation. Specifically, action-oriented individuals reported less un-
pleasant feelings in response to repeated failure experiences (Brunstein & Olbrich, 
1985). In a similar vein, action-oriented individuals showed less depressive symptoms 
compared to state-oriented individuals, especially when levels of stress were high 
(Rholes, Michas, & Shroff, 1989). Furthermore, increases in action orientation predicts 
whether phobic patients can overcome their phobic fears (Schulte, Hartung, & Wilke, 
1997).  
Koole and Jostmann (2004, Study 1) examined the temporal dynamics of affect 
regulation in action- versus state-oriented individuals. In line with prior research (e.g., 
Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985), action-oriented participants displayed significant down-
regulation of tense mood after the induction of mild stress. More important, however, 
this down-regulation was not so much apparent immediately after the induction of 
stress, but rather when moods were assessed 10 minutes afterwards. No similar de-
creases in tension were found when no stress was induced or among state-oriented par-
ticipants. This finding supports the notion that action orientation entails efficient down-
regulation rather than a decreased sensibility towards aversive affect.  
Finally, research has begun to investigate how action orientation regulates basic 
affective reactions without relying on explicit affect measures. Specifically, Koole and 
Jostmann (2004, Study 2) examined the effects of action orientation in an affective 
Simon task. In this task, participants were required to provide a positive or negative re-
sponse to a target stimulus on the basis of a non-affective stimulus feature (e.g., gram-
matical status). Although the valence of the target stimulus was irrelevant and should be 
ignored during the task, participants displayed an “affective Simon effect” (De Houwer 
& Eelen, 1998), i.e., they gave faster responses and made less errors when the valence 
of the target stimulus was congruent with the valence of the response. However, when 
the affective Simon task was preceded by the induction of mild stress, action-oriented 
participants were faster and made less errors compared to state-oriented participants on 
trials that required them to give positive responses to negative targets. This effect was 
interpreted as an up-regulation of worsened basic affect evoked by the prior induction of 
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mild stress. Taken together, these findings suggest that action orientation can regulate 
basic affective reactions. It remains to be seen, however, whether action orientation can 
also regulate basic affective reactions that are triggered subliminally.  
 
The Present Research and Hypotheses 
 
We designed the present research to examine the link between action orientation and 
regulation of subliminally triggered basic affect. To address this issue, we used a sub-
liminal parafoveal priming paradigm (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) to prime action-
oriented and state-oriented participants with schematic drawings of angry, neutral, or 
happy human faces (Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). These stimuli are displayed 
in Figure 1.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
We assumed that the schematic faces have an intrinsic affective value to people 
that is similar for action- and state-oriented individuals. To test this assumption, we 
conducted a pilot study (N = 59). In this study, action-oriented and state-oriented par-
ticipants indicated to what extent they perceived the happy, neutral, and angry faces as 
being negative, disapproving, and aggressive (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). Action-
oriented and state-oriented participants’ evaluations of the happy and angry faces did 
not differ, all Fs < 1. Furthermore, the two groups evaluated the neutral face similarly as 
negative and disapproving, Fs < 1. The only statistically detectable difference lies in the 
perceived aggressiveness of the neutral face, F(1, 57) = 4.85, p < .05. State-oriented par-
ticipants found the neutral face more aggressive than action-oriented participants, M = 
5.00 vs. M = 3.97, respectively. Overall, we concluded that action-oriented and state-
oriented individuals do not differ in their evaluation of the prime stimuli.  
In the parafoveal priming task, participants were subliminally exposed to angry, 
or neutral, or happy schematic faces. The exposure time for each face was 30 ms, which 
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has been shown to be below the level of conscious awareness in this task (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1996). After the subliminal priming task, participants completed a preference 
judgment task to measure basic affect (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988).  
Our main hypothesis was that action orientation would regulate the effects of 
subliminal affective priming on basic affective reactions. More specifically, we ex-
pected that subliminal affective primes would evoke congruent reactions among state-
oriented participants, such that subliminal priming of angry faces would lead to lower 
basic affect compared to subliminal priming of happy faces. By contrast, we expected 
no such priming effects among action-oriented participants. As regards subliminal prim-
ing of neutral faces, we expected that basic affective reactions in response to those faces 




Participants and Design 
 
Ninety-two paid volunteers at the Free University of Amsterdam (33 men and 59 
women, average age 20) participated in the study. The design was 2 (action orientation: 
action vs. state; between participants) x 3 (prime valence: happy vs. neutral vs. angry; 
between participants). Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental condi-
tions (happy: N = 31; neutral: N = 30; angry: N = 31). The dependent variable consisted 




Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were led to individual cubicles each contain-
ing an Apple Macintosh (iMac) computer. Experimental instructions were administered 
via computer-program. Participants were first informed that they would complete a se-
ries of unrelated tasks, which were ostensibly administered together for efficiency rea-
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sons. Participants first completed a study on ‘personality’, which contained a Dutch 
translation of the Action Control Scale (ACS90; Kuhl, 1994). The ACS90 served as our 
measure of individual differences in action versus state orientation. On completion of 
the ACS90, participants moved on with a parafoveal priming task, in which happy, an-
gry, or neutral faces were presented outside of conscious awareness. Participants were 
told that very brief flashes would appear at unpredictable places and times, and that 
their task was to decide whether a flash appeared on the left side or the right side of the 
screen. Immediately after the parafoveal priming task, participants completed a prefer-
ence judgment task to measure basic affect. Next, participants moved on to some unre-
lated filler tasks, which lasted about fifteen minutes. Finally, participants continued with 
a funneled debriefing procedure (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), after which they were 






The ACS90 (Kuhl, 1994) measures two interrelated but conceptually independent types 
of action versus state orientation: first, the capacity to initiate goal-directed action under 
high demands (demand-related action orientation, AOD), and second, the capacity to 
engage in goal-directed action in response to threatening experiences (threat-related ac-
tion orientation, AOT)1. According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), threat and demand rep-
resent qualitatively different types of aversive affective states, each requiring a specific 
form of intuitive affect regulation.  
In the present research, we administered two 12-item subscales of the ACS90, 
which respectively measure AOD and AOT. The items of both subscales were inter-
mingled and presented in a different random order for each participant. Each of the 
items describes a stressful situation, and an action-oriented versus state-oriented way of 
coping with that situation. For each item, participants were asked to select the response 
Subliminal Affect Regulation 11 
that best described their own reaction to that situation. An example item of the AOD 
subscale is “When I know that I must finish something soon: A. I have to push myself to 
get started. B. I find it easy to get it done and over with”. An example item of the AOT 
subscale is “When I am being told that my work is completely unsatisfactory: A. I feel 
paralysed. B. I don’t let it bother me for too long.” In both example items, A represents 
a state-oriented response, and B represents an action-oriented response. Action-oriented 
responses were coded as “1”, whereas state-oriented responses were coded as “0”. 
Scores were then summed for each subscale. Participants who gave 7 or more action-
oriented responses on the AOD scale were classified as action-oriented (N = 45), 
whereas participants with less then 7 action-oriented responses were classified as state-
oriented on that subscale (N = 47). An identical procedure was followed for the AOT 
scale, N = 34 vs. N = 58, respectively2.  
A priori, we had no strong predictions on whether the subliminal priming proce-
dure would primarily evoke effects of AOD or AOT. To the extent that the angry faces 
would be perceived as threatening (Öhman et al., 2001), we would expect to find effects 
of AOT rather than AOD. However, the angry faces that were used in the present study 
had a closed mouth with a downward curve, whereas threat is much more strongly asso-
ciated with an open mouth with bared teeth (Aronoff, Barclay, & Stevenson, 1988). A 
closed mouth in a downward curve has been found to signal strong negativity but only 
moderate activity (Lundqvist, Esteves, & Öhman, 1999). In view of these considera-
tions, it seems possible that the angry faces would signal disapproval rather than threat, 
which would lead one to expect effects of AOD rather than AOT. In the remainder of 
this article, we will generally refer to the broader term “action orientation” rather than to 
its specific subcategories unless a more precise distinction is required for clarification.  
 
Subliminal Affective Priming 
 
The parafoveal priming task was modelled after Chartrand and Bargh (1996). The prim-
ing task was introduced to participants as a study on reaction speed to visual stimuli. We 
instructed participants to react as quickly and as accurately as possible to brief flashes 
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that appeared at various locations on the computer screen. When a flash appeared on 
the left side of the screen, participants were to press a green key on the left side of the 
keyboard. When a flash appeared on the right side of the screen, they were to press a red 
key on the right side of the keyboard. Participants were told that the flashes would ap-
pear at unpredictable times and locations, and that the best strategy would be to keep 
their eyes on a fixation point in the center of the screen. Before participants started with 
the actual task, they were given five practice trials. During the practice trials, no faces 
were primed. During the following 24 experimental trials, participants were sublimi-
nally primed with happy, or angry, or neutral faces. Each face prime was presented for 
30 ms, and was immediately followed by a 100 ms mask consisting of dots and lines. 
No feedback was given to the participants regarding their performance during the para-
foveal priming task (for more details regarding the parafoveal priming task, see Char-
trand & Bargh, 1996).  
 
Basic Affect Measure 
 
Our measure of basic affect was adapted from Tesser et al. (1988). Participants were 
informed that the next study was on the aesthetic evaluation of words. They were to 
evaluate the pleasantness of some non-existing words on a scale ranging from 1 (un-
pleasant) to 7 (pleasant). Only the two anchors of the scale were labeled. Participants 
were told that the experimenters had chosen non-existing words in order to avoid dis-
turbing influences of word meaning. Participants were instructed not to spend too much 
time on the evaluation and to simply report their first reactions. The three non-existing 
words (“pleban”, “lempon”, “tokitorer”; Stapel, 2002) were shown in random order for 




At the end of the experimental session, we assessed whether participants had been 
aware of the priming procedure. We used a funneled debriefing procedure (Chartrand & 
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Bargh, 1996) in which participants were asked questions about the study with in-
creasing specificity. First, participants had to indicate what they thought had been the 
purpose of the tasks they had performed. Next, they were asked to indicate whether they 
thought that the tasks were related to each other, and whether anything about the study 
seemed strange or suspicious to them. Finally, participants were asked to indicate what 
they had seen during the flashes. No participants guessed the real purpose of the ex-
periment, neither did they report being suspicious about the priming procedure. The ma-
jority of participants (92.4 % of the entire sample) reported to have seen something un-
related to the prime stimuli (e.g., a pattern of lines). Seven participants (7.6 % of the 
entire sample), however, reported that they had seen a head, a face, or a smile during the 




Reliability coefficients for AOD (Kuder-Richardson (KR) 20 coefficient = .70) and 
AOT (KR 20 coefficient = .73) were satisfactory. We only report effects on AOD, since 
all effects on AOT were non-significant (all Fs < 1). Reliability for our basic affect 
measure was unacceptably low (Cronbach’s alpha = .21). Therefore, we decided to con-
duct both multivariate analyses with the three single implicit affect items as separate 
dependent variables, as well as univariate analyses with the averaged overall basic af-
fect scale as a dependent variable3.  
Both analytic strategies yielded similar results. Specifically, a 2 (action orienta-
tion: action vs. state; between participants) x 3 (prime valence: angry vs. neutral vs. 
happy; between participants) multivariate ANOVA with three basic affect scores as de-
pendent variables yielded a significant interaction between action orientation and prime 
valence, F(6, 154) = 2.56, p < .03,   2 = .09,    = .84. Likewise, a 2 (action orientation: 
action vs. state; between participants) x 3 (prime valence: angry vs. neutral vs. happy; 
between participants) univariate ANOVA with participants’ averaged basic affect rat-
ings as dependent variable revealed a significant interaction between action orientation 
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and prime valence, F(2, 79) = 4.46, p < .05,   2 = .08,    = .75. To facilitate the inter-
pretation of the effect, however, we report only the simple analyses on the averaged 
overall basic affect scale. Relevant means are displayed in Table 1. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
LSD post hoc analyses revealed that prime valence had a significant effect on 
basic affect among state-oriented participants, F(2, 79) = 4.40, p < .05,   2 = .07,    = 
.74. More specifically, subliminal priming with happy faces resulted in higher basic af-
fect compared to subliminal priming with neutral (p < .05), or angry faces (p < .01), M 
= 4.24 vs. M = 3.44 vs. M = 3.17, respectively. However, prime valence had an oppo-
site, albeit nonsignificant, effect on basic affect among action-oriented participants, F(2, 
79) = 1.01, p > .2. Subliminal priming with happy faces resulted in slightly lower basic 
affect among action-oriented participants compared to subliminal priming with neutral 
or angry faces, M = 3.50 vs. M = 3.71 vs. M = 4.04, respectively.  
An alternative way to interpret the results is to note that subliminal priming with 
angry faces resulted in lower basic affect among state-oriented participants compared to 
action-oriented participants, F(1, 79) = 4.76, p < .05,   2 = .04,    = .58. By contrast, 
subliminal priming with neutral faces did not yield any differences in basic affect be-
tween state-oriented and action-oriented participants, F < 1. Finally, subliminal priming 
with happy faces resulted in marginally higher basic affect among state-oriented partici-
pants compared to action-oriented participants, F(1, 79) = 3.86, p = .053,   2 = .03,    = 
.49.  
Additional analyses revealed that performance during the parafoveal priming 
task had no effect on basic affect ratings. More specifically, when we reran the analyses 
with the average number of incorrect responses during the parafoveal priming task (3.8 
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%) and participants’ mean response times for each trial (334 ms) as covariates, all 




Past research has shown that subliminal affective priming can have a significant impact 
on people’s basic affective reactions (Chartrand et al., 2003; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; 
Stapel et al., 2002; Winkielman et al., 2005). In the present article, we explored whether 
action-oriented individuals are capable of regulating subliminally triggered basic affect. 
Our results showed that subliminal affective priming effects were only found among 
state-oriented participants. By contrast, action-oriented participants’ basic affective re-
sponses were not influenced by subliminal affective priming. Indeed, action-oriented 
participants displayed higher basic affect compared to state-oriented participants in re-
sponse to priming with angry faces. Taken together, the present research provides evi-
dence that action-oriented individuals are able to regulate subliminally triggered basic 
affect.  
 The present findings add to prior research that has demonstrated efficient down-
regulation of basic affect among action-oriented individuals (Koole & Jostmann, 2004). 
In this prior demonstration, however, the affect eliciting stimuli were consciously acces-
sible to the participants. The present study is thus the first to show that action orienta-
tion promotes affect regulation even when the source of the affective reaction remains 
unrecognized. This finding is notable because prevalent theorizing has suggested that 
subliminal affective reactions unfold early during stimulus perception and relatively un-
impeded by top-down processes (Zajonc, 2000). Moreover, prior research has shown 
that subliminally elicited basic affect resists conscious interventions (Winkielman et al., 
1997).  
 How can we reconcile the present findings with existing ideas about the nature 
of subliminally elicited basic affect? PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000) suggests that action-
oriented individuals regulate their affective states so that affect facilitates goal-directed 
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behavior. Goal-directed behavior is served best when individuals do not suppress any 
affective signal that comes along but remain susceptible to potential opportunities and 
dangers (Carver & Scheier, 1990). In line with this assumption, prior research has 
shown that intuitive affect regulation among action-oriented individuals does not inter-
fere with automatic vigilance for negative affect (Koole & Jostmann, 2004, Study 3). 
Consequently, the present finding does not challenge the idea that basic affective reac-
tions unfold early during stimulus perception (Zajonc, 2000). However, the present find-
ing does suggest that people are able to exert volitional control over these basic affec-
tive reactions. This volitional control over basic affect is likely to rely on unconscious 
control processes (Kuhl, 2000) rather than on conscious attribution (Winkielman et al., 
1997).  
 Subliminal affect regulation seems adaptive for several reasons. First, subliminal 
affect regulation allows people to control basic affective reactions without knowing 
their cause. Second, subliminal affect regulation presumably does not rely on the limited 
capacity of the conscious mind. As a consequence, people are likely to regulate affec-
tive reactions that are triggered by more than one single cause. The present research has 
shown that action-oriented individuals can regulate affective reactions that are caused 
by repeated subliminal exposure to the same (aversive) stimulus. Although it remains to 
be examined by future research, we can speculate that action orientation may not only 
shield against the affective consequences of a rainy morning (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), 
but also against the scowling faces caught up in the same morning’s traffic jam.  
 
Limitations and Future Perspectives 
 
The present research is still preliminary and leaves several questions unanswered. First, 
in line with PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000) our suggestion was that action-oriented participants 
actively regulate their basic affective reactions. Although this assumption has been con-
firmed in prior research (Koole & Jostmann, 2004), it was not directly tested in the pre-
sent investigation. Future research on subliminal affect regulation should therefore in-
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clude more direct measures of affective regulation (e.g., affective Simon task) as well 
as pretest measures of basic affect. 
Second, the present findings differ from prior research, which has consistently 
found main effects of subliminal affective priming rather than an interaction between 
subliminal affective priming and action orientation (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; 
Stapel et al., 2002). Prior research has not controlled for individual differences in action 
orientation, which renders speculations about its role during these studies difficult. One 
possible explanation for the inconsistency between studies is that prior research has un-
wittingly relied on observations of predominantly state-oriented samples. This corre-
sponds with the significant main effect of prime valence among state-oriented partici-
pants in the present research.  
An alternative explanation would be that the difference between our reseach and 
prior work is due to differences in the situational context in which the priming took 
place. According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), action-oriented individuals are unlikely to 
regulate their affective states when the situational context endorses relaxation. In line 
with this assumption, basic affective reactions between action-oriented and state-
oriented participants have been found to be similar under relaxing and accepting cir-
cumstances (Koole & Jostmann, 2004). Possibly, the context in which our research took 
place endorsed relaxation to a lesser degree compared to prior research. Further research 
is required to gauge the conditions under which subliminal affect regulation among ac-




Feelings sometimes arise without any obvious cause. Such basic affective reactions pose 
a challenge to people’s affect regulation skills because they can be unpredictable and 
resistant to attempts at conscious control. Using a subliminal affective priming para-
digm, the present research was able to show that action orientation may allow people to 
shield themselves against the intrusion of basic affective reactions. This capacity for 
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subliminal affect regulation seems a remarkable human achievement, which may pro-




1. The terms "threat-related" and "demand-related" action orientation were suggested by 
Koole and Jostmann (2004) as alternatives to Kuhl’s (1994) original "failure-related" 
and "decision-related" action orientation, respectively. We believe that the new denota-
tion fits better with relevant constructs within PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000). 
 
2. The sample splits on the AOD and the AOT subscales were performed on the norma-
tive midpoints derived from a large-scale study among Dutch university students (N = 
1,457; Koole, 2003; cf. Kuhl, 1994). We further examined our data using a regression 
approach. The results showed that the critical AOD X Prime Valence interaction on ba-
sic affect was significant,    = - .242, t(84) = - 2.25, p < .03. Thus, the regression and 
ANOVA approaches revealed equivalent results. We report the ANOVA results in the 
main body of this article to facilitate inspection of the absolute means.  
 
3. We believe that the low reliability coefficient of the implicit affect measure can be 
explained by a peculiarity of our task. Specifically, task instructions informed partici-
pants that the experimenters were interested in why some combinations of letters were 
evaluated more positively than others. Presumably, these instructions had made partici-
pants believe that their preferences for some of the stimuli should be expressed in com-
parison to other stimuli. As a consequence, a relatively positive evaluation of a target 
stimulus might have been followed by a comparatively negative evaluation of a subse-
quently presented target stimulus. Given the random order presentation of the three 
stimuli, intercorrelations appeared to be rather weak. 
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Table 1 
Mean basic affect ratings as a function of orientation and subliminal affective priming 
(standard deviations appear in parentheses).  
 Subliminal affective priming 
 Happy Neutral Angry 
Orientation M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n 
Action orientation 3.50 (1.29) 12 3.71 (1.10) 14 4.04 (.63) 18 
State orientation 4.24 (.85) 18 3.44 (.96) 13 3.17 (1.37) 10 
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